THE FOREIGN POLICY of SOVIET RUSSIA

Report Submitted by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the Seventh All-Russian Congress of Soviets (Nov. 1918 to Dec. 1919).

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More than a year has elapsed since the last All-Russian Congress of Soviets. During this time the cardinal question in the domain of foreign policy has been the question of peace with the Entente Powers who are attacking us, who support the counter-revolution in Russia and are endeavouring to strangle the Soviet régime by a hunger blockade. On November 7th last year, the Sixth Congress made to the Entente Powers a solemn offer to begin peace negotiations and charged the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs with the task of taking all the necessary steps to carry out this decision. For more than a year the Soviet Government has been doing all it could to bring about a cessation of the war and the blockade, but to this hour the world-reaction in the persons of the Entente Powers and their hired assassins, the Tsarist generals, has been bending all its energy and using all means in order to make an end of the proletarian revolution as personified by Soviet Russia.

PEACE OFFERS TO THE ENTENTE.

Immediately after the declaration of the Congress of Soviets on November 7th, the People's Commissariat sent comrade Litvinoff to Sweden with authority to get into touch with the Entente Governments in order to prepare negotiations for peace. At Stockholm, comrade Litvinoff gave an interview to Mr. Ransome, the correspondent of the Daily News, announcing our readiness to make financial and economic concessions to the Allies. This interview was the subject of lively comment in the British press and helped the opposition against intervention, which was then beginning in England, and
which has since then been on the increase and has at present attained very serious dimensions. On December 18th we sent comrade Litvinoff full powers to enter into provisional negotiations with the Entente Powers concerning a settlement. On December 23rd comrade Litvinoff sent out a circular note to the representatives of the Entente at Stockholm, reminding them of the decisions of the Congress of the Soviets, and suggesting the opening of preliminary negotiations for peace. In addition, comrade Litvinoff sent a cable to President Wilson, who was at that time in London, pointing out the inevitable consequences of the continuation of intervention, and again offering negotiations for a settlement, to include economic and technical assistance to Russia. He emphasised the fact that our enemies were able to spread about us, without let or hindrance, lies and slander, and even to forge documents, while we were not even able to counteract these machinations and to expose the fraud.

At that very moment, however, Koltchak’s successes and, more particularly, the capture of Perm, lent new wings of hope to the world-reaction and played into the hands of those who opposed an agreement with Russia. At the end of December an important conference took place in Paris, at which Pichon, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, discussed in detail the question about Allied intervention in Russia. He explained that intervention was begun with a view to preventing Germany from withdrawing her troops from the East to the West, but added at the same time that intervention “must enable those Russians, who had remained faithful to the Allies, to organise and to combat the ruin and anarchy, whose consequences might affect France herself, who was defending in Russia her rights violated by the Bolsheviks.” Pichon then communicated the instructions which had been issued by Clemenceau to the French generals. They had for their object:—To secure for the Russian enemies of the Bolsheviks a technical superiority over them. A telegram from Clemenceau, dated December the 21st expressly laid down that “the plan of the Allies is economically to pen in the Bolsheviks, and will be carried out immediately.” In discussing comrade Litvinoff’s offer, the British press mentioned another
statement by Pichon, made by him in the French Chamber at the beginning of January, to the effect that the Allies had decided to destroy Bolshevism by means of economic isolation.

On January 12th, having learned from an American wireless the declarations made by Hitchcock, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the American Senate, on the reasons which had prompted the United States to take part in intervention in Russia, the People’s Commissary sent a wireless to the American Government, pointing out that whatever view one might take of these reasons, at present at any rate, they were no longer valid, in consequence of which the Commissary was asking the American Government to name a place and time for the commencement of negotiations for peace.

At the same time, under the pressure of the growing popular movement against intervention, the Entente Powers issued a declaration to the effect that they were giving up armed intervention in Russia. In the middle of January, the French General Confederation of Labour, and the Permanent Administrative Commission of the Socialist Party, adopted resolutions noting with satisfaction these declarations. In consequence of this, on January 17th the People’s Commissariat sent out a wireless to the Entente Governments, pointing out that as a matter of fact, intervention was still going on, and asking when their declaration would be carried out, and when peace negotiations could commence.

**FRENCH HOSTILITY.**

During this period one could notice more and more a divergence between the policy of the French Government, which did not even want to hear anything about a compromise with us, and the line of policy pursued by Lloyd George, who was proposing that the Entente should invite the parties at war in Russia to conclude an armistice, and to initiate negotiations for a mutual agreement. The French Government flatly rejected the suggestion. On January 14th, the ‘People’s Commissary reminded comrade Litvinoff of the negotiations which had been started in the summer of last year, for an economic agreement with England, and invited comrade Litvinoff to enter into negotiations with the Entente,
with a view, among other things, to allay the opposition of the French government, which was particularly dissatisfied with our abolition of all the old debts. The People's Commissary added that we were prepared to examine in conjunction with the French government, the methods of satisfying France on that head.

**THE PRINKIPO PROPOSAL.**

The policy of Lloyd George and Wilson temporarily gained the upper hand at the Peace Conference in Paris. On January 23rd, we intercepted a Paris wireless sent out without any address, to the effect that the Peace Conference was inviting all Russian parties at war among themselves to conclude an armistice, and to send representatives to the Prinkipo Islands, near Constantinople, to enter, in conjunction with representatives of the Entente Powers, into negotiations for an agreement. On January 28th, the People's Commissary for Foreign Affairs sent a wireless to President Wilson, pointing out that the Soviet government had received no invitation to the Prinkipo Conference. As a matter of fact, such an invitation was never, either then or afterwards, sent to us directly.

On February 4th, the Soviet government sent to the Entente governments a note which was afterwards approved by the All-Russian central committee. In all its previous peace offers the Soviet government had merely invited to commence negotiations, without putting forward any concrete suggestions. In the note of February 4th, such concrete suggestions were put forward for the first time. We pointed out that we were prepared to make most substantial concessions for the sake of peace, but added that the extent of such concessions would depend upon our military situation at the moment of signing the agreement. At that time our military situation was rapidly improving, and the Soviet troops were advancing on all fronts with great rapidity.

The note of February 4th offered concessions on four points:—1.—Acknowledgment of the financial obligations towards the creditors in the Entente countries. 2.—Payment of interest on State loans in raw material. 3.—The granting of concessions to Entente capitalists on the condition that such concessions would not effect the
internal Soviet régime. 4.—Territorial concessions involving the occupation of areas forming part of the old Russian Empire, by armies drawing support from the Entente. We were also prepared, in case of an agreement with the Entente Powers, to include in it a pledge not to intervene in the internal affairs of those Powers. On this basis the Soviet government was prepared to enter into negotiations either with all or separate Powers of the Entente or with such political groups as the Entente Powers would indicate, at a place chosen by them, including the Prinkipo Islands.

The note of February 4th, made a great impression in the political world of the West and America, and strengthened considerably the position of the opponents of intervention. Even the Daily Mail, the organ of our worst enemies in England, wrote on February 8th, that French political circles were taking the view that the reply to the Soviet government had cleared the air. Nevertheless, the Russian counter-revolutionary groups in Paris refused to take part in the Prinkipo Conference, and were supported by the French government.

THE BULLITT AGREEMENT.

At the beginning of March, Mr. Bullitt, the head of the Political Information Department of the American Peace Delegation, came secretly to Russia with a proposal for an agreement emanating from President Wilson and drawn up with the knowledge of Lloyd George. The proposal was carefully examined by the Soviet Government; certain amendments having been accepted by Bullitt who found them quite reasonable, a draft agreement was drawn up jointly with him on March 12th which the Soviet Government undertook to accept, provided it was submitted to it by the Entente before April 10th. This draft provided for the summoning of a special conference for the conclusion of an agreement on a definite and previously agreed upon basis; the belligerent parties in Russia were to cease their efforts to overthrow one another by force, and to retain the territories under their rule, except such territorial changes as might be made by the conference; and to recognise the right of the populations of these territories to change subsequently the political régime. The
blockade was to be lifted, and Soviet Russia was to be allowed freely to exchange goods and to establish relations with other countries. The Entente was to pledge itself to cease all assistance whatever to the political groups opposing the Soviet Government. A political amnesty was to be granted by all the belligerent parties, and diplomatic relations were to be restored between the Soviet Republics and the Entente Powers.

As was afterwards revealed by Bullitt's disclosures, his plan, on his return to Paris, met with complete approval on the part of Lloyd George, but afterwards a mysterious change of scenery took place, and the draft agreement was forgotten. In the British House of Commons Lloyd George even denied having had any knowledge of Bullitt's journey. It must be observed that at this time a new offensive of Koltchak was taking place on the Eastern front accompanied by considerable successes, and the official press of the Entente countries already saw in him a dictator of all the Russias. In England the policy of our worst enemies, with Churchill at their head, gained the upper hand. In addition, according to subsequent information, the formation of a Soviet Republic in Hungary in the middle of March had so frightened the ruling circles of the Entente and especially President Wilson, as to induce them to repudiate the plan of agreement with Soviet Russia.

On April 3rd the well-known Norwegian explorer, Nansen, offered the Council of Four to organise in Russia a supply of foodstuffs and medicines, to be distributed by a commission of neutrals. On April 17th the Council of Four gave its consent to this scheme, with the reservation that all military operations were to be stopped in those particular districts in which the neutral commissions would start their operations. It was not until May 4th that news of this was received by the Soviet Government, since as it eventually turned out, all Governments had refused to transmit it. It was, in fact, received from the Norwegian Legation in Berlin. It must be noted that Nansen's scheme offered no guarantee that the suspension of military operations on our part might not have been exploited by the counter-revolutionary Tsarist generals for the purpose of strengthening their position and preparing a decisive
blow against the Soviet régime. Hence, Soviet Russia, in order to safeguard herself, could only accept the scheme under definite guarantees drawn up in conjunction with the Governments concerned. On May 7th the People's Commissary for Foreign Affairs replied to Nansen that the Soviet Government gratefully accepted his scheme, and asked him to name the place and time where our delegates could meet his Commission, while pointing out at the same time that the negotiations about the suspension of military operations could only be carried on with the Entente Governments themselves. The Soviet Government was willing to conduct such negotiations, and would, indeed, enter into them with pleasure. Nansen replied by promising that our communication would be transmitted to the Entente Governments. We thus once more offered to initiate negotiations for the suspension of military operations, but no reply was vouchsafed.

On the whole, the programme drawn up by us in conjunction with Bullitt still continued for some time afterwards to be regarded by us as valid, subject, of course, to such changes as might be suggested by circumstances. In this sense we made repeated declarations in the course of the summer of this year, when Entente politicians and journalists were addressing inquiries to us on the subject.

**APPEALS TO THE WORKING CLASSES.**

In the absence of normal relations with the Entente Governments, we repeatedly addressed appeals to the working classes themselves of these countries, protesting against such and such barbarities and illegal actions of their Governments, explaining to them our position and calling upon them to help us in our struggle for peace and for the chance of peaceful labour. On April 19th the People's Commissary for Foreign Affairs, in an appeal to the working classes of the Entente, called upon them to be careful not to let themselves be deluded by the mendacious assurances of their Governments about the cessation of intervention, and to continue their efforts to prevent their respective rulers from strangling the workers' and peasants' revolution in Russia. On April 17th, at a time when demonstrations were expected
on July 21st in all the Entente countries in favour of the cessation of intervention, the People's Commissary again addressed an appeal to the labour organisations of the Entente countries, explaining to them how persistently the Soviet Government had been endeavouring to get peace, and pointing out that it was up to them to compel their respective Governments to cease all further attempts to strangle the Russian Revolution. Again on September 27th, in an appeal to the workers of the Entente, the People's Commissary called upon them to exercise pressure upon their respective Governments in order that they should not hinder the Baltic Governments from making peace with us. On October 30th, in an appeal to the labouring masses of France, England and Esthonia, the People's Commissary drew attention to the participation of Esthonian troops in Yudenitch's attack on Petrograd, and called upon them to put an end to the continued machinations of the world-reaction.

We also repeatedly addressed wireless protests to the Entente Governments, collectively and individually. Thus, on January 21st, we protested against their retention of our war prisoners in Germany, and their enforced enrolment for the counter-revolutionary bands. On February 18th the People's Commissary addressed a protest to the Entente Governments in connection with the advance of the Polish Legion acting under the Entente's promptings. On April 16th the People's Commissary sent a protest to the British Government against the outrages committed against the Soviet representatives in Persia with the direct connivance of British agents. On April 21st the People's Commissary again addressed a protest to the British Government in connection with the brutal shooting of the Baku Commissaries in Central Asia by order of British agents. A second protest on the same subject was sent to Great Britain on June 14th, when we received in Moscow documentary evidence concerning details of this bestiality. On August 13th the People's Commissary protested against the brutalities committed by the English on our prisoners in the north. On November 10th the People's Commissary sent out a wireless to all the Entente Governments protesting against the criminal brutalities of their hired assassins, the counter-revolu-
tionary generals, in respect of our Red Army prisoners, and, in particular, of the murder of our captured comrades, generals Nikolayeff and Stankevitch.

THE EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS.

We also carried on wireless negotiations with the Entente Governments on individual questions such as the exchange of prisoners with England, and the return of Russian soldiers from France. As far back as January 24th the Russian Soviet Government offered to the British Government to exchange comrade G. Raskolnikoff, who had been taken prisoner in the naval fights in the Finnish Gulf and unlawfully thrown into prison by the British, as well as comrades Shaumian, Djaparidge and other members of the Baku Government, with their families, who had been kidnapped by the British from Baku, for the British Mission at Vladikavkas. We demanded decent treatment for comrade Raskolnikoff and the Caucasian comrades, and threatened reprisals. The British prisoners captured by us then raised the question of a general exchange, and transmitted a request through us to the British Government. On February 13th we suggested to the British Government that permission might be granted to a commission appointed by us to visit England for making the necessary preparations for a general exchange of prisoners. On February 22nd, Major Goldsmith, the head of the Vladikavkaz Mission, who was in our hands, transmitted to the British Government our suggestion that Litvinoff should together with him go to Stockholm to prepare a general exchange of prisoners. On March 21st Lord Curzon replied in the negative on the question of the journey of our representative. Dr. Martini, the head of the Danish Red Cross Mission, and afterwards Parker, the representative of the British Red Cross Mission, who had come specially for the purpose to Finland, became intermediaries in our subsequent negotiations for the exchange of comrade Raskolnikoff. On March 23rd we requested the British Government to hasten its reply and pointed out that the British officers captured by us would be kept in prison so long as the same treatment was meted out to Raskolnikoff and other comrades captured by the British. Simultaneously the
British command on the northern front entered into negotiations with our command in order to arrange for a general exchange of the prisoners on the northern front. After protracted preliminary negotiations, a mixed commission consisting of representatives of the People's Commissary of Foreign Affairs and of representatives of the Allied Command in Archangel met at Vologda on April 29th, while another delegation of ours at the same time proceeded to Archangel, where, however, it was found impossible to make any preparation for an exchange. At Volodga the Allied representatives insisted upon a general exchange on the northern front at a time when we were already negotiating directly with the British Government about a general exchange. Hence, we were at Volodga willing to accept only a partial exchange of a certain number of prisoners, head per head, for some prisoners in the hands of the Allies. The latter, however, did not accept anything but a general exchange of prisoners on the northern front, which was unacceptable to us in view of our decision to solve this problem on a more general basis by direct arrangement with the British Government. The negotiations at Volodga led to no results.

Mr. Parker continued to negotiate with us, and in the end we were ourselves constrained to accept his demands, and to authorise him to communicate on April 25th to the British government, the scheme drawn up by him, and adopted by us, namely, in return for the release of Raskolnikoff and his companion comrade Niniuk from prison, the British in Russia were also to be released from prison, and subjected to house arrest only, and the former were to be exchanged for 17 British in our hands. After that it seemed to be possible to begin a general exchange of prisoners, and with this end in view the Soviet government asked for permission to send a Soviet Red Cross Mission to Archangel, for purposes of control. On May 12th, Lord Curzon replied increasing the demands for the return of comrades Raskolnikoff and Niniuk, making it at the same time conditional upon a general exchange, but refusing absolutely the admission of Soviet Red Cross Mission to Archangel. We replied by finally accepting the scheme for exchanging eighteen British officers, sailors and soldiers for comrade Raskol-
nikoff, but demanding the absolute separation of the question of the exchange of comrade Raskolnikoff from that of a general exchange of prisoners. In virtue of an agreement thus arrived at comrades Raskolnikoff and Niniuk, returned to Russia on May 28th.

LORD CURZON'S EVASIONS.

On June 8th, we suggested a new scheme of a general exchange of our and Allied prisoners, without the officers whom we wanted to exchange for certain prominent comrades who had been captured at Baku and Persia. We demanded at the same time the admission of delegates to London or some neutral country with a view to preparing and carrying out a general exchange, collecting information as to the Russian citizens residing in England who wanted to return to Russia, and receiving their complaints. On June 28th, Lord Curzon rejected the suggestion for a general exchange embracing all the Allies, and offered an exchange, first, of all of the officers and soldiers, head per head, and then of civilian prisoners, also head by head. In the place of our commission he agreed to admit to England neutrals, and those only of high position. We replied on July 3rd that our notions of what was high position cardinally differed from that of the British government, and that we regarded it as a matter of supreme necessity that our direct representatives should be admitted to England or some neutral country for the purpose of control over the exchange of prisoners, and in particular, for the collection of information about our nationals who wanted to come back and from whom we had long been separated. We concluded by declaring that any other suggestions on that question would be regarded by us as unacceptable. On July 19th Lord Curzon began to make suggestions, and asked us whether our statement could be interpreted in the sense that we would agree to an exchange of British prisoners if a Russian Red Cross representative were to be admitted to a neutral country with a view to ascertaining the position of Soviet citizens in England. On July 30th we explained in detail to the British Government the conditions on which we proposed to organise the visit of our Commission to a neutral country. The British reply was very long in coming. Instead, British
volunteers were arriving in the north, and we announced our intention of treating prisoners who had volunteered to fight against the Russian people differently from those British soldiers who had been sent against us against their will. On August 10th Lord Curzon replied by personal threats against the members of the Soviet Government in case anything should happen to British prisoners. On August 13th we sent to the British Government an indignant protest against the brutal treatment meted out to our prisoners on the northern front, and announced that we were compelled to deprive the British officers of the privileges hitherto given to them. We added that if the British Government were again to address inadmissible personal threats to us, we should stop all negotiations whatever even on the question of prisoners. A few days later we captured at Kronstadt several British officers and sailors, so that the number of British prisoners in our hands increased still more. At last, on September 15th, Lord Curzon gave his consent to allow our commission to proceed to a neutral country—namely, Denmark, but somewhat restricted the conditions which we had demanded for its stay there. On September 19th we declared that we should prefer Norway or Sweden to Denmark, and demanded an alteration in the conditions under which our commission would be allowed to stay in the neutral country. We mentioned comrade Litvinoff as our delegate. Nearly a month later, on October 15th, Lord Curzon replied insisting on Denmark as the place of meeting of the commissions of the two countries, but agreeing to the other conditions demanded by us. On October 16th we replied by giving our consent, but a new delay occurred owing, apparently, to the successful advance of Yudenitch. It was not until November 7th that we received from Lord Curzon a definite invitation to send comrade Litvinoff to Denmark via Estonia.

RUSSIAN PRISONERS IN FRANCE.

After Soviet Russia had gone out of the Imperialist war, the Russian soldiers who had been sent by the Tsarist Government to France and were now refusing to continue the war after the conclusion of peace by Russia, were subjected to most barbarous persecutions at the
hands of the French authorities and of the Russian officers maintained by them, who tried to compel them to go to the front. Subsequently the Russian soldiers in France were subjected to all sorts of maltreatment as a means of compelling them to join the counter-revolutionary forces of Denikin and Yudenitch. A similar treatment was meted out to the Russian troops who had been sent by the Tsarist Government to Macedonia, and afterwards passed under the French command, in order to break their spirits and make them amenable to the French designs. Many of them were sent to the African colonies where they were subjected to all sorts of atrocities. Those among our comrades who were regarded by the French authorities as particularly dangerous were thrown into military prisons, and suffered horribly. As far back as January 16th the People’s Commissary sent a protest to the French Government on account of the brutalities committed upon our soldiers in Macedonia. On March 10th the Acting People’s Commissary, comrade Karahan, sent a protest against the horrors to which the Russian soldiers in France were being subjected. Several other protests were sent by us at a later date. The return of our soldiers from France and Macedonia had been the subject of negotiation from the first days of the Soviet Republic, but nothing could be obtained from France except a few vague promises. At the time of the exchange of the Entente diplomatic and military representatives in Russia at the end of last year, it had been agreed that the French military mission would be exchanged for our soldiers, and our Red Cross mission was to proceed to France to control the carrying out of the agreement. After protracted negotiations with the French Government we succeeded, by the end of January, in settling all the questions connected with the journey of our Red Cross mission to France, and comrades Manuilsky, Armand, and Davtian were appointed members of the mission. They set out for France at the beginning of February, simultaneously with the arrival of our first soldiers from France, but on arriving there found they could do nothing. They were placed in isolation in a sort of honorary confinement on the island of St. Malo, and were not allowed to exercise
any control over the return of Russian citizens from France to Russia. Half of the number of the French military mission was allowed to leave Russia at the moment of the departure of our Red Cross mission, and we announced that the other half would be released only when the return of our soldiers was practically provided for, and we saw that it was actually proceeding and would be carried out to the end. Yet at the beginning of April, the French Government sent us a demand for the immediate return of all the members of the French military mission still in Russia. It only agreed to release 900 soldiers out of a total of 35,000 in France and Africa, without moreover, giving anything beyond a vague promise to return the others. We demanded that our Red Cross mission should be allowed to visit all the places of confinement where our comrades were, in order to see that nothing was being done to prevent their returning to Russia. We also demanded that the mission should be allowed to draw up a comprehensive plan for the return of our soldiers to Russia, and to carry it out immediately. In view of our refusal to release the rest of the French military mission, the French Government on April 12th declared that it was sending back our Red Cross mission, together with 1,000 Russian soldiers, and that it would continue to send back Russian soldiers irrespectively of any agreement with the Soviet Government. On April 15th we pointed out to the French Government that its action in forcibly returning our Red Cross mission was a violation of all the previous arrangements, and as a result, the Soviet Government was obliged to reserve complete freedom of action. After that, the French Government sent back a few more thousands of our soldiers via Odessa. As we learned only recently, when Denikin commenced his advance, the French Government began sending out soldiers to him, and he subjected them to all sorts of outrages in order to compel them to march against the labouring masses of Russia. On November 20th the People’s Commissary sent a strong protest to the French Government against the surrender of Russian soldiers to the counter-revolutionary Russian executioners.

RELATIONS WITH AMERICA.

On June 20th we sent a protest to the American
Government on account of the arrest of comrade Martens, the Russian representative in America, threatening reprisals on American citizens in Russia. The American Government replied that comrade Martens had not been arrested. It appeared from supplementary information that he had only been detained in custody for a few hours, while a search was being carried on at the offices of our mission at New York. This search was the turning point in the attitude of the American Government towards our representative. Up till then it had not interfered with his work, and he was actively engaged in negotiating with the American commercial world for an exchange of goods the moment the blockade was lifted. The search inflicted a heavy blow upon this strictly business-like work of comrade Martens; the American Government added a warning that it would lend no protection to the transactions between American citizens and Soviet Russia. Our representative, however, in spite of the more difficult conditions, continued his work in America, assisting at same time those political workers who were agitating against intervention in Russia. But as time proceeded, the reaction in the United States raged more and more wildly, and on November 20th, on the strength of the British wireless messages announcing the arrest of comrade Martens, the People's Commissary again sent a protest to the American Government, threatening reprisals and demanding the immediate release of comrade Martens and a suitable indemnity, and the cessation of all persecutions of Russian citizens loyal to the Soviet régime, and suitable indemnities for those who had actually suffered through those persecutions.

SCANDINAVIA.

The Scandinavian countries were touched upon in connection with the Aaland Islands. In a note dated October 2nd we protested to the so-called Supreme Council of the Allies against the arbitrary decision on the subject of these islands, and declared that we did not recognise the authority of the Council in the matter, and did not accept its decision.

The Entente programme of the complete isolation of Russia from all sides implies the cessation of all rela-
tions also between the Scandinavian countries and Russia. By reason of an alleged discovery of propaganda literature on certain couriers of the Soviet Government, the Entente diplomatic missions demanded a rupture of relations between Sweden and the Soviet Government. On December 7th the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs announced to the plenipotentiary representative of the Soviet Republic, comrade Vorovsky, that the Swedish Government was obliged to deprive him of the right to send couriers and to employ cipher, and "was assuming that the Russian mission would leave Sweden." When at the end of December comrade Vorovsky wanted to go to Denmark to see the acting plenipotentiary at Copenhagen, comrade Suritz, the Danish Government refused him a visit. In a letter addressed to comrade Vorovsky and dated December 21st, the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs demanded that he should leave the country by January 25th. Comrade Vorovsky protested against this demand, and left Stockholm on January 30th together with comrade Litvinoff who was at that time in Sweden, and with the acting plenipotentiary in Copenhagen, comrade Suritz.

The diplomatic and consular missions of the Scandinavian Governments in Soviet Russia were gradually wound up by means of successive departures—for the most part, in an unofficial manner. First the Ministers went, then the Secretaries of the Legation, and after them the Consuls. At last only the Danish Red Cross remained, which undertook the protection of the interests of the citizens of the Scandinavian and other Western European countries as well as of the United States. The existence of diplomatic protection for citizens of countries who were refusing all protection to our citizens was an abnormal phenomenon which the Soviet Government decided to end. On its part, the Danish Red Cross had some unknown reason for recalling its representatives from Soviet Russia, and so on July 9th of the present year the Danish Red Cross left the country and thereby all relations and intercourse between Soviet Russia and Western Europe were finally broken off. In view of the rupture of relations and the absence of all protection for our citizens in Sweden we had no particular motive in placing Swedish citizens in Russia
in a better position that that in which our own citizens had been placed in Sweden. So far as can be seen from information emanating from Sweden, the rupture with Soviet Russia, imposed upon that country by the Entente, is having a highly detrimental effect on Swedish industry and commerce, so that the Swedish business world is very anxious to restore normal relations with us. At the same time, the working masses of the Scandinavian countries were very energetically pressing their respective Governments to establish friendly relations with Soviet Russia. On October 20th a great demonstration took place at Stockholm, protesting against the Entente demand for the adhesion of the neutral countries to the blockade of Russia, and demanding the immediate renewal of relations with us. In reply to a deputation from the demonstrators the Minister for Foreign Affairs said, that the question also had another aspect which must be borne in mind, thus hinting at the pressure exercised by the Entente.

SWITZERLAND.

Our relations with Switzerland broke off with the expulsion of our mission from Berne. For some little time the contact was maintained through the Swiss Minister, Junot, whom we kept back for a little while in Russia pending the receipt of a safe-conduct to Russia for the many thousands of Russian citizens in Switzerland. But the subsequent intensification of the blockade and the failure of the Swiss Government to keep its pledge in providing a safe-conduct for the Russian citizens has kept the latter to this day in Switzerland where they live in a hostile atmosphere and very difficult conditions. At present there are practically no negotiations with Switzerland about the return of Russian citizens, since the Federal Government vouchsafes no reply to our inquiries on the subject. In return, no Swiss citizen in Russia is allowed by us to return home.

GERMANY.

Diplomatic relations with Germany were broken off three days before the German revolution. Among the luggage of the courier who was proceeding from Moscow to comrade Joffe, our plenipotentiary representative, was
a box which strangely broke open at one of the railway stations in Berlin, revealing the presence of German revolutionary leaflets which we had never put in there. On this ground, and in view of this ostensible violation of article 2 of the Brest Treaty, forbidding the contracting Governments to carry on an agitation against the institutions of the other country, and further on the ground that the assassins of Count Mirbach had not been discovered and had not been tried, the German Government, on November 5th, expelled our Embassy with all the missions attached to it from Germany, and recalled from Russia its own Embassy and missions. At the outbreak of the German revolution the German workers and soldiers at Petrograd, Moscow, and other towns, elected their own Soviets in the place of the Government institutions of the previous German régime, and took part in the organisation of the departure of the German Consuls. We had to watch carefully lest in the guise of employees of the Consuls some counter-revolutionary Russian citizens might leave the country. We had also to control the property which was being carried off by the personnel of the Consuls. While this was going on, the train conveying our Embassy from Germany was standing on the demarcation line near Borisov and afterwards at the Witgenstein Station. At last the German Consuls were allowed to proceed, and an exchange took place on the demarcation line. Simultaneously our mission returned from Switzerland.

The German revolutionary masses demanded from the first moment the return to Berlin of comrade Joffe, and the restoration of normal relations with Russia. But the new Government which came into power in Germany at the outbreak of the revolution and consisted partly of Scheidemannites and partly of cowardly and hypocritical Independents, was trying, on the advice of Kautsky, to flirt with the Entente, and did everything in its power to prevent the restoration of relations with us and the formation of friendship between the two Republics.

On November 17th the German Government declared that it refused to accept the foodstuffs which we had sent to the hungry German masses. The German Council of People’s Commissaries was trying every means to
to delay the restoration of relations. On November 21st it demanded the definitive recognition by us of the new German Government as well as the return of the German Consulates as a condition of the restoration of relations. On November 26th the Soviet Government declared that it recognised every de facto Government, and that the German Consulates and missions were already on their way to Germany and would be exchanged for our Embassy and our missions.

Nevertheless, the new German Government did its best to complicate the relations between the two countries, using for this purpose the counter-revolutionary frame of mind of the German officers on the Eastern front and the Soldiers’ Councils which had been formed during the first days of the revolution under their influence and with their participation in the main centres of the occupied areas. After the defeat of German militarism, the Entente took upon itself the mission to carry on a war against revolutionary Soviet Russia and charged the German troops with continuing the occupation until such time as they would be relieved by the Entente or counter-revolutionary troops. The French Consul in the Ukraine, Hennot, openly proclaimed this scheme of the Entente which was also put forward by the British naval command in its negotiations with Winnig, the German Commissary in the Baltic. According to this plan, the German armies were to continue their duties as police until the arrival of relief troops. Afterwards it became known, from the admission made by Kautsky at the Lucerne Conference, that the armistice treaty between the Entente and Germany contained a secret clause under which Germany was to maintain troops for fighting Bolshevism in the East until the arrival of the Entente. It was this policy of servility to the world-reaction which Kautsky, in his capacity as Under-Secretary to Herr von Solf, Foreign Minister, was carrying out. But the German troops were not at all willing to wait, and rushed back to their country in crowds, being followed by the Soviet troops occupying the vacated places, but avoiding all conflict with them. However, these efforts were not always successful because of the pronouncedly counter-revolutionary temper of the officers and those elements in the army.
who were under their influence. Gradually the Soviets (consisting partly of officers) which had been formed at first, were replaced by genuine Soldiers’ Soviets, and in consequence, the relations between them and our troops began gradually to improve. But at Kovno, where the main headquarters were situated, the old counter-revolutionary Soviet, consisting, to a large extent of officers was not re-elected, and these officers and such-like elements tried their best to provoke conflicts with the Soviet troops, particularly those of the Ukraine, of which full use was made by the central German Government anxious to disturb the relations with Soviet Russia and to prevent the establishment of friendship between the two countries. At the same time the German troops were plundering right and left the places which they were evacuating, the officers and, generally, the commanders particularly distinguishing themselves by their predatory practices. We had to protest against this procedure, but the German Government took under its protection not only the officer thieves, but also the White Guards who remained after the departure of the Germans and against whom the Soviet troops were obliged to take up a fight. Thus, on December 4th, the German Government protested against the advance of our troops at Pskoff, that is, took under its protection the hooligan White Guard bands whom the Soviet troops had to expel from Pskoff by force. In this way the German Government was trying to represent us as the aggressors, and to instil into the minds of the German masses the idea that the Soviet Government was carrying on an offensive against Germany. In this manner a legend was created and studiously spread by the German Government during many months, that the Soviet Government was intending to invade German territory. Everything, in fact, was being done to poison the minds of the German masses on the subject of Soviet Russia. Internally, throughout Germany, government agents were carrying on an anti-Bolshevik propaganda on a large scale, spreading all sorts of slanders against the Soviet régime and against Joffe and other Soviet workers. As early as November 13th the All-Russian Central Executive Committee unanimously adopted a decision repudiating the Brest Treaty. The German
Government did not protest against it. On December 5th, a delegation of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee consisting of comrades Bukharin, Joffe, Rakovski, Ignatoff and Radek set out for Berlin to attend a congress of the Soviets. The Berlin Executive Committee welcomed in a wireless the visit of the delegates who were permitted to pass the line of demarcation, but were held up by the counter-revolutionary Kovno Central Soviet of the Eastern front, which on December 5th announced that it would not permit them to proceed further. The delegation thus found itself detained in a most insulting manner, even a machine gun being placed on the railway carriage in which it travelled. On December 17th, on returning to Moscow, Joffe sent a protest to the Berlin congress of soviets in the name of the whole delegation. The congress at first passed a resolution condemning the action of the Government and inviting the Russian Soviet Government to send the delegates immediately, but afterwards the united congress of German workers' and soldiers' delegates acquiesced in the absence of our delegates. The conference strengthened the position of the Scheidemann gang. The reaction in Germany grew stronger, and on December 23rd the German Government announced its decision not to admit any representatives of ours into Germany, including the Red Cross mission. In the course of 1919 our Government repeatedly proclaimed its readiness to renew normal relations with Germany, but so far without result.

In consequence of the expulsion of our Embassy from Germany, the German Government handed over the care of the Russian war prisoners to a private bureau consisting of persons for whom our Government could not accept responsibility. The attitude of the German governing circles was becoming more and more impudent. The Embassy building was handed over to a counter-revolutionary priest, and the papers remaining after the departure of our diplomatic mission fell into the hands of the Russian Whites and were published by them in Berlin. On January 11th the offices of the Russian Telegraph Agency in Berlin was sacked, and a short time afterwards the same fate befell even the private War Prisoners' Bureau, which had been established by
the German Government itself.

Conflicts with the Soviet troops were being artificially provoked on the eastern front by the German counter-revolutionary officers. Each time we succeeded in getting round the counter-revolutionary German command and in establishing direct contact with German soldiers, our relations with the latter invariably assumed a most friendly character; the transfer of evacuated places would be effected quite peacefully, and very often the German soldiers themselves would show complete sympathy with the Spartacists. For instance, the evacuation of German units from Ukrainian towns frequently took place with the assistance of Soviet troops, and the German soldiers showed a pronouncedly revolutionary attitude and perfect solidarity with our comrades. Some German units, on their way home, passed through the territory of the Russian Republic, as the crossing of the young Polish Republic was either impossible, or too dangerous for them. In proportion, however, as the German soldier masses who offered a favourable ground for revolutionary ideas, were passing home, only counter-revolutionary elements of a very pronounced character remained in the districts adjoining Germany, more especially in Courland and Lithuania. The German command started the practice of replacing the departing units of its old army by new volunteer “White Guard” formations. In Courland it co-operated with the local barons who were also publicly praised and complimented by the former “labour leader,” the social-democratic Winnig, now Government Commissary. The so-called Iron Division and the Landwehr in the Baltic and the German Volunteer units at Kovno formed the basis for the subsequent new offensive of the counter-revolution.

On February 12th our comrade Radek was arrested at Berlin, and two days later the German wireless circulated the allegation that documents had been found on him showing the intention of the Russian Soviet Republic to provoke a revolution in Germany and simultaneously to attack German territory. On February 15th we sent a wireless to the German government, the Central Council, and all the Soviets of Germany, protesting against these mendacious allegations about the supposed aggressive aspirations of Soviet Russia against Germany.
In spite of our denials, the German Government press continued to beat the big drum about our schemes for intervention in Germany. The reactionaries were trying to frighten the German popular masses into believing that in case of a revolutionary movement, Russian troops would come and enslave Germany. On April 17th, we once more sent a wireless to the German government, protesting against these slanders and categorically denying any aggressive designs on our port.

In the meantime the question about the Russian war prisoners in Germany was becoming very acute. A great rush of our war prisoners home began from the very first days of the German revolution, but the German government partly left them callously to their fate, so that large numbers of them perished on the road, and partly subjected them to brutal repressions, or shot them for refusing, for instance, to work in the mines.

On the arrival of Entente agents in Berlin, they took the Russian war prisoners under their control, and announced that they would not allow them to return to Soviet Russia. In consequence of this, on January 21st., we announced to the German government that we regarded the German consent to this decision as a hostile act against Soviet Russia. Then began an extensive recruiting of our war prisoners for the counter-revolutionary bands. The Entente agents fed them, hoping thereby to gain their sympathies for the counter-revolution. In the overwhelming majority of cases, however, these hopes proved baseless, and our comrades among the war prisoners firmly resisted all attempts to recruit them for a war against their brothers. Throughout 1919 this pressure continued, now by means of promises and then by means of threats, the German government, junker-like, supporting this policy of the Entente. Nevertheless, the question of the return of our war prisoners passed through various stages. On April 10th, the Allied Armistice Commission gave its consent to their return home. Actually, however, only a small number were able to find their way to Russia, as the newly formed Border States were separating Germany from Russia by a continuous wall, and either refused to let them pass, or after admitting them, compelled them to enter the White Guards or interned them. To this day the question of their passage
through Poland, Lithuania and Latvia has not been settled, while repeated protests have been made by us against the continued recruiting or even forcible despatch of our prisoners to Denikin or Yudenich. On this account the Soviet government has been obliged to stop the return of German war prisoners from Russia.

Solf's successor, Count Brockdorf-Rantzau, Foreign Minister, speaking at Weimar on February 15th, about the relations between Germany and Russia, stated: "We have at present neither a treaty nor any diplomatic relations with Russia, and are virtually at war with her."

Documents which were received last autumn, and more particularly a letter of the White Guard, General Potocki, who was in Berlin at that time, show beyond shadow of doubt that the German government had not only been assisting in the formation of White armies on our western front, but had been paying the troops of Prince Lieven. The Tsarist Senator, Belgard, was the intermediary between Russian White guards and the German government, which agreed to organise assistance for them, and a whole net of institutions was at work in Germany for the formation of White troops to fight us on the Western front. In his appeal to the working classes dated September 11th, the People's Commissary wrote: "Noske and Churchill, these two pillars of international gendarmerie, have stretched out their hands to one another, and have organised behind the backs of their own peoples, a secret diabolical alliance against the world proletariat."

As is well known, the aggressive policy of German reaction in the East, and the obvious signs of an increase of the Pro-German orientation in the leading circles of the Russian counter-revolution, at last frightened even the governments of the Entente, who, in consequence, have at present squashed the game of the German reactionaries, and the Russian Whites under Von der Goltz and Avaloff—Bermont in the Baltic. But to this day the Entente governments are still far from being completely united on the question, so that we are still exposed to the danger of surprises from their side. It is also known that the German government has refused to join in the blockade of Soviet Russia. This refusal, however, has no real value, as Soviet Russia is no longer in immediate contact with Germany.
Protracted negotiations were carried on with the German government on the question of the return to Russia of comrade Radek and comrade Axelrod, who had been condemned in Munich for participation in the Bavarian Soviet government. Comrade Radek was appointed representative of the Ukrainian Soviet government, and promised in case of his return, favourably to consider several economic questions at dispute with Germany. Comrade Axelrod, when attached to the Bavarian Soviet government was invested with plentary powers from the Soviet government, which guaranteed him his personal safety. Hostages were taken in the Ukraine for the safety of comrade Radek, and other hostages were taken in Soviet Russia for the safety of comrade Axelrod. The German government agreed to let both return to Russia after our government had promised that they would prevent them by every lawful means to go back to Germany. Up till now, however, it has proved impossible to find for them a way to return to Russia, since Great Britain objects to the return of Radek, while the Lithuanian government agrees to let him pass only at the price of the return of all the most prominent Lithuanian hostages,—a bargain that would leave our comrades in the hands of Lithuania and Taryba unprotected. However, at the present moment we have some reason to hope that in the near future, we shall see in our midst once more comrades Radek and Axelrod.

AUSTRIA.

The question of the return of war prisoners played a great part also in our relations with Austria. There, in Austria, as well as in Hungary, Russian war prisoners at the outbreak of the revolution, also streamed back home, in an elemental fashion; and there, also, the new governments who had been formed on the ruins of the Dual Monarchy, treated our war prisoners with most criminal negligence, as the result of which they perished in masses. Then they too drew upon themselves the attention of the representatives of the Entente governments, and a large number of Russian war prisoners were sent to the Balkan Peninsula, where they were subjected to all sorts of outrages and pressure, with a view to compelling them to enter Denikin's army. Our war prisoners and Red Cross
mission in Austria-Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia were exposed to all sorts of persecutions. Some were expelled immediately, others remained under arrest or in prison for a long time. A portion of our mission in Austria has not returned to this day.

**HUNGARY.**

The powerfully expanding revolutionary movement in Central Europe led to the formation of a Hungarian Soviet republic on March 21st, and, subsequently to the formation of similar republics in Bavaria and Slovakia. It will be remembered how the world reaction concentrated all its strength on their destruction, in consequence of which those little republics were unable to hold up. The principal weapon of the world-reaction against Red Hungary was Roumania, who had also shown itself an implacable enemy of Soviet Russia. A savage White Terror was at the time ruling in Bessarabia, which had been occupied by Roumania, aggravated by an equally savage policy of Roumanisation and ordinary plunder. On May 1st, the two Soviet governments, the Russian and Ukrainian, demanded the immediate evacuation of Roumanian troops, officials, and agents from Bessarabia, trial by popular court of persons guilty of violating the laws of the country, the restoration of Russian military property seized by Roumania in Russia and in the Ukraine, and the restoration of the private property confiscated in Bessarabia to their original owners. Denikin's advance, which soon afterwards began, drew the forces of the Soviet republics away from their struggle against Roumania, in consequence of which the latter was enabled to play the infamous rôle of executioner towards Red Hungary.

**THE BORDER STATES.**

On March 30th, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Abrami, declared in the Chamber, that the Entente governments intended to render active assistance against the Bolsheviks to the Border States by supplying them with armies, funds, clothing, equipment, and food-stuffs. A concerted offensive against Russia on a part of the Border States and the Tsarist generals Koltchak, Denikin and Yudenich, supported by the
Entente, constitute the salient feature of the latest stage of our struggle, which is still not quite finished. In the first six months of 1919, great activity was exhibited among the Border States by Finland, at the head of whose affairs there still stood the extreme militarists led by Mannerheim. The reactionary Finnish press which at that time reflected the views of the governing cliques, was carrying on an intense agitation during the spring, in favour of an offensive against Petrograd. This agitation was combatted by the organs of the so-called Centre, that is, those political groups which are in power in Finland at present. As far back as March 22nd, one of these organs, "Helsinkin Sanomat," gave out the political watch-word: "Neither peace nor war." At that moment, however, other groups were in power, and feverish preparations were being made in Finland for a war against us. In April, the Finnish volunteers, mixed with regular units, invaded our Olonetz province. An exchange of notes ensued between us and Finland, in which the Finnish government tried by every trick to represent the Soviet government as the aggressor, while we were exposing the mendacity of those accusations and pointing out the constant attacks on us on the part of Finland. A Finnish military expedition was fighting on Soviet territory in the Olonetz province, Finnish aeroplanes were raiding Petrograd, and Finnish batteries were bombarding our fleet. However, this entire campaign ended in nothing. The Finnish troops showed such a great reluctance to attack Petrograd that the expedition which had been prepared during the spring, did not take place. The Olonetz campaign also ended in a complete fiasco for the Finnish Imperialists, and lastly, the Centre which got hold of the reins of power took up the practical application of its policy of "Neither peace nor war."

POLAND.

More serious was the offensive on the part of Poland, which had succeeded almost completely in crushing the Red-Lithuanian and White-Russian Soviet republics. The counter-revolutionary "border" policy of the Entente had brought all its heavy pressure to bear upon the newly formed Soviet republics in the north and south. After the departure of the German troops on December 24th,
the All-Russian Central Executive Committee had solemnly recognised the independence of the Estonian, Lettish and Lithuanian Soviet republics, while the Ukraine Soviet government in a manifesto, dated January 28th, had invited all these nationalities to enter into diplomatic relations with it. Just at that time we were carrying on negotiations with Mazurenko, a representative of the Petlurian government, and were offering our good offices with a view to the cessation of military operations between the Ukrainian Soviet republic and the Petlurian government. The latter, however, had lost almost all its territory, succumbed to the influence of reactionary elements, and this made an agreement impossible. Simultaneously with the German revolution, the Polish Republic arose, whose first Social-Patriotic Government struck at once an extremely hostile note in its relations with Soviet Russia. At the outbreak of the Polish Revolution the Polish labouring masses in Moscow had themselves replaced the delegation of the former Regent's Council, the organ of the German occupation authorities in Poland, by a representative Polish body. The Social-Patriotic Government of Moraczewski protested against the suppression of the agents of the Regent's Council. Negotiations were opened with a view to the return of these agents to Poland, as to which the Soviet Government gave its general consent. On January 2nd, however, our Red Cross mission which had been expelled from Poland, was brutally massacred in the Vysoko-Mazovtz district. On January 19th the reins of power were taken over by the purely bourgeois Cabinet of Paderewski, which, however, took up a less hostile attitude towards the Soviet Government. Its representative, Wienckowski, came to Moscow to settle a number of questions such as those relating to the murder of our Red Cross mission, the exchange of prisoners, the return of refugees, etc. He handed over to the Soviet Government a declaration of the Central Committee of the Polish Socialist Party, alleging that Soviet Russia was pursuing an aggressive policy against Poland. We replied by declaring that we had no aggressive designs, and that we were ready to come to an agreement with Poland on the basis of a plebiscite of the labouring classes in the disputed regions, and to offer a similar
agreement to the Lithuanian Soviet Republic. In April, however, Poland began an offensive against Red Lithuania and the White-Russian Republic, and on April 25th the People’s Commissary for Foreign Affairs addressed a note to Wienckowski, condemning the traitorous attack of the Polish troops of Wilna as characteristic of the true attitude of the Polish Government towards our offers, and inviting him to leave the territory of Soviet Russia. The People’s Commissary, however, added that the Soviet Government was prepared at any moment to enter into negotiations for an agreement, so soon as Poland ceased its war-like attitude. At the present moment, comrade Markhleewski, representing the Russian Red Cross, is negotiating with the Polish Red Cross for the exchange of prisoners and refugees; in fact, agreements relating to the exchange of hostages and civilian prisoners have already been concluded by him.

The new offensive of the counter-revolution led to the destruction of the Estonian Soviet Republic, and the almost complete destruction of the Lettish Soviet Republic. The fight waged by Soviet Russia against its aggressive enemies, however, proved so successful that already on August 31st the Soviet Government found it possible to offer peace to White Esthonia, and on September 11th to White Lithuania, White Latvia, and Finland. The negotiations which were begun with Esthonia in September were, however, broken off by her with a view to renewing them later on in conjunction with the other Baltic States. Finland alone refused to negotiate with us. As a matter of fact, the Estonian Government assisted Yudenitch in his attack upon Petrograd, while maintaining all the time the fiction of making preparations for a renewal of peace negotiations with us. Yudenitch’s debacle turned this fiction into reality.

THE AWAKENING EAST.

In the East the Soviet Government is reaping the fruits of the frank and far-seeing policy which it had adopted from the first days of its formation. Externally, the circumstances were shaping themselves unfavourably for us. We were cut off from the Far East, while intercourse with the Middle and Near East was interrupted
by the occupation of the routes to Turkestan through the Caucasas and the Black Sea by White Guards. Our official representatives, in spite of the inclination of certain Asiatic Governments, such as the Chinese, to establish relations with us, were refused admission under the pressure of the Entente or else were subjected to persecutions, arrests and expulsion as, for instance, in Persia. Special cordons were established against our penetration, while numerous native and European organs, maintained by the Entente, were trying to prejudice the oriental Governments by alleged horrors of Bolshevism. In spite of this, the idea of the Russian Revolution proved for the enormous majority of the popular masses, enslaved by European and American capitalism, a powerful stimulant which awakened them from their century-long slumber. Both statements of individual representatives of the revolutionary organisations in the East, China, India, Persia, Japan, and the eastern press have shown us clearly what an enormous impression the November revolution has had upon the minds of the eastern peoples by its watchwords about self-determination and by our addresses to the Moslems, Chinese, Koreans, Mongols and other races of the East.

Since the end of last year Moscow has been receiving delegates from almost every revolutionary organisation of the East, who have been coming at great personal risk through all the barriers. As a matter of fact, in spite of the sanitary cordons of the Entente, we are at present maintaining close contact, if not with the Governments, at any rate with the revolutionary and sometimes even simply progressive elements in the East. We addressed the Governments of northern and southern China, the Mongolian Government, the Persian Government and the revolutionary organisations of Korea, stating our concrete programme and giving up the entire legacy of the Tsarist régime and of its continuation by Kerensky’s Government. We solemnly announced to the Turkish and every Moslem race our sincere desire to help the Moslem world in its fight for the restoration of its lost liberties.

In the beginning of 1919 a revolution occurred in Afghanistan, the only remaining Moslem State enjoying independence. The pro-British Government of Habibulla-Khan was overthrown and a constitution was introduced.
Military operations ensued against England, which owing to the support lent by the Indian revolutionaries to the Afghans, led in August 1919 to the conclusion of a peace of unprecedented disgrace to British Imperialists. The British were compelled to recognise the complete independence of Afghanistan and to pledge themselves not to interfere either in the foreign or internal affairs of Afghanistan, that is, to abandon those privileges which had been the corner-stone of British policy in Central Asia during the preceding half-century. In spite of the conclusion of peace, certain independent tribes, allied with Afghanistan, continued to occupy British territory, and we learn from Afghanistan sources that the struggle for the emancipation of Central Asiatic races and of India from the British yoke has only subsided for a time.

In November 1919 an extraordinary Afghan mission arrived at Moscow to establish with Soviet Russia treaty relations, and to announce to other foreign Governments the independence of Afghanistan. This mission was not permitted by the Entente to travel from Russia to Europe, but our conversations have established the complete identity of our interests in the fight of the Asiatic races for self-determination as against the rapacious and unscrupulous enslavers. Our own representatives are at present at Kabul.

To whatever eastern country we turn our eyes, whether Persia, China, Korea, Turkey or Egypt, we observe a deep fermentation which is assuming more and more the concrete form of a movement against European and American capitalism. This movement has for its ultimate object the attainment of our ideals.